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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL ARE PROPERLY 
FOUNDED ON PROCEEDINGS IN THE LOWER COURT, AS 
REFLECTED IN THE RECORD ON APPEAL. 
Respondents1 contention that appellant's arguments on appeal 
are not supported by the record of proceedings in the lower court, 
Argumentf Point I, Respondents' Br.,5-7, is without merit. 
On September 30, 1987, Chief Justice Gordon R. Hall heard and 
granted Appellant's Motion To Supplement The Record On Appeal. 
Pursuant to his Order, Appellant's Exhibit 1, attached, appellant 
supplemented the Record On Appeal, hereinafter "ROA", with a 
transcript of various proceedings in the lower court, in order to 
fully amplify the basis for appellant's arguments in this appeal. 
ROA, 667-816. 
Appellant's contention that the trial court abused its 
discretion by deciding and instructing the jury that under the 
former Utah Comparative Negligence Act, Section 78-27-37, U.C.A. 
(1953), as amended, 1973; repealed, Section 78-27-38, U.C.A. 
(1953), as amended, 1986, the negligence of appellant's decedent, 
Darin Kelson, should be compared to the negligence of respondents, 
to bar or reduce appellant's recovery, Argument
 f Point I, 
Appellant's Op. Br., 7-23, is fully supported by the record on 
appeal showing the arguments of counsel and the rulings of the 
lower court concerning this issue, including the statements of 
appellant's counsel concerning appellant's intention to appeal the 
1 
lower court's ruling on this issue. ROA, 362, 550, 749-779; 784-
808. 
Similarly, appellant's contention that the trial court erred 
in ruling that the siblings of appellant's decedent could not 
recover damages under Utah's Wrongful Death Statute, Section 78-
11-7, U.C.A. (1953), Argument. Point II, Appellant's Op. Br., 23-
26, is premised on the lower court's decision and ruling on this 
issue, as reflected by the record. ROA, 677, 685-695, 732 and 
737-739. 
Finally, appellant's contention that the trial court abused 
its discretion by denying appellant's motion for relief from, and 
suppression of, a certain stipulation relating to the alleged 
blood alcohol content of appellant's decedent, Darin Kelson, where 
appellant's former counsel, Robert B. Hansen, entered into the 
stipulation without the knowledge or consent of appellant, and 
contrary to appellant's expressed desires regarding the 
prosecution of this action, Argument, Point III, Appellant's Op. 
Br., 27-29, is predicated on the lower court's denial of the 
motion, as demonstrated in the record. ROA, 714-726, 733-34, and 
739-41. 
2 
POINT II. RESPONDENTS1 ARGUMENT THAT THE 1973 UTAH 
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE ACT APPLICABLE TO 
THIS CASE PERMITS THE NEGLIGENCE OF 
APPELLANT'S DECEDENT TO BE ATTRIBUTED TO 
APPELLANT FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASSESSING THE 
DAMAGES RECOVERABLE BY APPELLANT, WHO WAS 
NOT NEGLIGENT, IGNORES THE PLAIN TERMS OF 
THE STATUTE AND WELL-ESTABLISHED RULES OF 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. 
Contrary to Respondents1 suggestion, Respondents1 Br., 8, 
appellant does not contend that the trial court abused its 
discretion in admitting evidence regarding the negligence of 
appellant's decedent. ROA, 778-79, 794-95. 
Appellant's contention is simply that where, as here, the 
respondent's negligence was found to be a proximate cause of the 
death of appellant's decedent, and the appellant seeking recovery 
for the death of his decedent, was not negligent at all, the 1973 
Utah Comparative Negligence Act applicable to this case does not 
bar appellant's recovery against respondents, or permit the 
reduction of the damages recoverable by appellant by the 
percentage of negligence attributable to the appellant's decedent. 
In order to avoid the plain effect and construction of the 
statute in question, respondents first attempt to engage in 
impermissible legislative mind-reading, concluding that the 1973 
Utah Comparative Negligence Act cannot mean exactly what it says, 
merely because the statute represents a departure from prior law. 
Respondents' Br., 8-9. 
When the applicable version of the Utah Comparative 
Negligence Act was adopted in 1973, Utah's Wrongful Death Statute 
had been on the books for approximately 60 years. Thus, it is only 
3 
reasonable to assume that the Utah Legislature considered the 
Wrongful Death Statute and the cases decided under its provisions, 
when the Legislature provided in the 1973 Utah Comparative 
Negligence Act, that "Any damages allowed shall be diminished in 
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person 
recovering." 
A commonly accepted canon of statutory construction is that a 
statute should be interpreted in accordance with its plain 
meaning. The application of this principle to the 1973 Utah 
Comparative Negligence Act supports appellant's contention that 
the statute represented a departure from prior law by the State 
Legislature. 
Respondents adopt the argument of appellant in their 
discussion of Van Wagoner v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. 186 P.2d 
293 (Utah, 1947), on rehearing. 189 P.2d 701 (Utah, 1948), 
Respondents1 Br., 9-10. 
It is precisely appellant's point that, prior to the 1973 
Utah Comparative Negligence Act, a decedent's contributory 
negligence rendered his death not wrongful, thus barring any 
right of recovery on behalf of his heirs under the Wrongful Death 
Statute, but that the Legislature's adoption of Utah Comparative 
Negligence Act in 1973, changed the law in this regard, by 
providing that the contributory negligence of a decedent would not 
bar his heir's recovery in a wrongful death action against a third 
party, and that his heir's recovery would not be reduced by the 
4 
decedent's negligence, such that the Van Wagoner case, and other 
decisions predating the 1973 Utah Comparative Negligence Act, are 
irrelevant to the case at bar. 
Respondent's reliance on Jensen v. Intermountain Health Carer 
Inc. . 679 P.2d 903 (Utah 1984), Respondents' Br., 10, is also 
misplaced since the statute before the Court in that case is 
different than the statute at issue in the case at bar. However, 
this Court's rationale for the construction of the statute at 
issue in Jensen is consonant with appellant's interpretation of 
the 1973 Utah Comparative Negligence Act 
The best evidence of the true intent and purpose of 
the Legislature in enacting the Act is the plain 
language of the Act. 
679 P.2d at 906. 
In the instant case, the plain language of the 1973 Utah 
Comparative Negligence Act, requires that appellant, who was zero 
percent negligent, should not be barred from recovering against a 
third party whose negligence was a proximate cause of his 
decedent's death, or have his damages reduced, by the percentage 
of negligence attributable to his decedent. 
Respondents also miss the point of Mayo v. Tri-Bell 
Industries, Inc., 787 F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir. 1986), which is 
that, under the Texas law applicable there, a cause of action for 
loss of consortium was "derivative". 
Respondents completely mischaracterize Hull v. Silver, 577 
P.2d 103 (Utah 1978), and appellant's reliance on it. Respondents' 
5 
Br., 12-15. Appellant cites Hull solely for its holding, 
acknowledged by respondents, that a wrongful death action is not a 
"derivative" action in the State of Utah. 
Hull did not consider the issue presently before this Court. 
However, its holding, denying the applicability of a then existing 
defense, Justice Hall's dissent notwithstanding, 577 P.2d at 10 6-
107, supports appellant's position here. 
Moreover, as argued in appellant's opening brief, the reason 
the recovery of heirs was barred prior to 1973 if the decedent was 
contributorily negligent, was because under the then existing law, 
the decedent's negligence rendered his death "not wrongful." In 
effect, contributory negligence on the part of the decedent took 
the case outside the application of the Wrongful Death Statute. 
Respondents take the concise, unambiguous language of Hull: 
"The action is not derivative", and torture it into implying that 
"a wrongful death action is essentially non-derivative, but 
subject to certain defenses which are derivative." Respondents' 
Br., 14. Appellant prefers to believe that the decisions of this 
Court mean what they say. 
Respondents' argument that the fact that a minority of states 
have permitted actions for the loss of consortium by a person for 
injury to a spouse by a third party, notwithstanding the 
negligence of the spouse, does not mean that appellant can recover 
under the facts of this case, because Utah has not recognized an 
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action to recover such damages, Respondents1 Br., Argumentr Point 
11(C), 15-20, is similarly incorrect and misleading. 
Appellant recognizes that Utah has not yet recognized an 
action for loss of consortium for an injury to a spouse, but so 
what? This is a wrongful death case, and the right to recover for 
loss of consortium in wrongful death cases, has existed for more 
than 60 years. 
Respondents' argument that the construction of the 1973 Utah 
Comparative Negligence Act urged by appellant, produces an 
"unfair" result, Respondents1 Br., 11, is simply, the subjective 
view of respondents. 
In adopting the 1973 Utah Comparative Negligence Act, 
Legislature spoke in clear and unambiguous terms. The statute is 
'entitled to a presumption of validity and fairness. If some 
unfairness is perceived by respondents, they are certainly at 
liberty to point them out. However, having enacted the measure, 
it should be up to the Legislature to change the statute, if it 
sees fit. 
Points III & IV of Respondents' Argument
 r require no 
response. Appellant's position on the right of the decedent's 
siblings to recover damages, and the blood alcohol stipulation 
issues, are fully elucidated in appellant's opening brief, and 
further supported by the additional citations to the Record On 
Appeal referred to at the beginning of this brief. 
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Appellant would like to alert the Court to the recent 
decision of Sheahan v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter 
Railroad Corporation, 496 N.E. 2d 1179 (111. App. 1 Dist. 1986), 
supporting appellant's contention that the siblings of appellant's 
decedent are not precluded from recovering damages for his death 
from a negligent third party in a wrongful death action, even 
though they are not defined as the decedent's heirs in the Utah 
Probate Code. 
POINT III. ADDITIONAL UTAH AUTHORITY IN SUPPORT OF 
APPELLANT'S POSITION ON THE COMPARATIVE 
NEGLIGENCE ISSUE. 
In Phillips v. Tooele City Corporation, 28 Utah 2d 223, 500 
P.2d 669 (1972), plaintiffs sued to recover damages to their 
automobile after it collided with a city garbage truck. At the 
time of the collision, the car had been operated by plaintiffs' 16 
year old daughter for whose negligence plaintiffs were responsible 
pursuant to Section 41-2-10, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended. 
The trial court determined that the plaintiff's daughter had 
been negligent as a matter of law in causing the collision. The 
court thereafter imputed the daughter's negligence to plaintiffs, 
since her mother had signed for the license. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed that the 
daughter had been contributorily negligent. Since 
this action was pre-1973, the daughter's personal 
claims were completely barred by her contributory 
negligence. With respect to the parents cause of 
action for damage to their vehicle, however, this 
Court held that the statutes in question were 
"designed solely to protect innocent third parties 
from the negligence of a minor driver by providing 
8 
f inanc ia l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ; there are no provis ions 
there in tha t may be reasonably construed to deny an 
owner the r i gh t to recover for a wrong done to 
him." (Emphasis supplied) 
In so holding, t h i s Court reasoned tha t 
[T]his l e g i s l a t i v e policy to broaden l i a b i l i t y for 
the p ro t ec t ion of an injured p l a i n t i f f gives no 
support to the doc t r ine of imputed cont r ibu tory 
neg l igence which narrows the l i a b i l i t y of a 
negligent defendant to a p l a in t i f f , who i s innocent 
of actual negligence. 
Id . at 673. 
Consequently, this Court remanded the case for a new trial to 
determine the negligence of defendant, if any, and the damages 
sustained by the plaintiffs. This result obtained even though the 
daughter had no recourse, and the plaintiff parents were 
statutorily financially responsible for their daughter's 
negligence.. 
Subsequently, in Otto v. Leany. 635 P.2d 410 (Utah 1981), 
this Court considered a similar case. There, however, the case 
was tried under the 1973 Utah Comparative Negligence Act at issue 
here. The jury found that the Leany fs minor daughter was 65% 
negligent, the plaintiff Otto 35% negligent, and the parents 0% 
negligent. The jury awarded Otto 65% of his damages, and the 
parents the full $900 in damages to their automobile. Otto 
appealed. The Supreme Court sustained the award to the parents, 
stating 
The plaintiff seeks to distinguish the Phillips 
[supra.] case as it was decided prior to 
comparative negligence. As such, he argues, when 
the Phillips case was decided the Court had no way 
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of assessing the degree of negligence which could 
be imputed. However, under comparative negligence, 
the Court is provided with a clear and concise 
method of assessing the imputed negligence. 
The problem with the plaintiff's argument is that 
he is comparing the wrong persons. The comparison 
between plaintiff and Cynthia is 35% plaintiff, 65% 
Cynthia. However, the comparison between plaintiff 
and Reed and Mary Leany is plaintiff 100%, and Reed 
and Mary 0%. 
IdL at 411. 
Appellant recognizes that this Court found support for its 
decision in bailment law. However, in both Phillips and Otto, the 
parents had statutory responsibility for the conduct of their 
daughters, and knowingly allowed the use of their automobile. 
Nevertheless, this Court, as it has always done absent a statutory 
mandate, refused to impute liability to non-negligent parties. The 
same policy should be followed in the case at bar. 
Respondents take the position that the negligence of Darin 
Kelson should be imputed to his non-negligent parents. Here, 
however, appellant seeks damages personal to him of far greater 
import than a dented fender. The damages have been authorized by 
statute for more than 60 years, and enjoy unique constitutional 
protection. Pre-comparative negligence cases denied recovery to 
the heirs only because contributory negligence on the part of the 
deceased rendered the death not wrongful, and took it outside the 
statutory and constitutional context. 
Under the 1973 Utah Comparative Negligence Act, there can be 
a wrongful death even where the plaintiff's decedent is negligent. 
10 
The Legislature has expressly stated that the only negligence to 
be compared with the tortfeasor's is that "of the person 
recovering. States with comparative negligence laws similar to 
Utah, unanimously hold that actions by family members for loss of 
consortium [which this is], are not affected by the negligence of 
the injured or deceased party. 
CONCLUSION 
The law, equity, and principles of fundamental fairness 
dictate that appellant recover the damages caused by respondents 
in this case. Since the jury found causative fault on the part of 
respondents, appellant respectfully submits that this Court should 
remand this action to the trial Court solely for a determination 
of damages. 
WHEREFORE, appellant respectfully requests that the judgment 
"No Cause of Action" entered against appellant below, be reversed, 
and the case remanded to a new jury for a determination of 
damages. 
Dated this JAf4* day of Mlt/mtfary^ , 1987. 
COLLARD>& RUSSB3ZL 
STEVE RUSSELL 
KATHRYN COLLARD 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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Darrell Kelson, personal 
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of Darin Kelson, deceased, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Salt Lake County, a political 
subdivision of the State of 
Utah; and Perry Buckner, in a 
representatiue capacity only, 
Defendants and Respondents 
No. 870106 
Upon hearing of appellant's motion to supplement the record 
with specifically designated portions of the record it is hereby 
ordered that the same be granted and 30 days be allowed for the 
reporter to complete the transcripts After the transcripts are 
filed appellant shall haue 10 days to file a reply brief; the 
respondent shall haue 20 days thereafter to make any modifications 
to its responsiue brief as deemed necessary. 
This order is conditional upon appellant assuming the 
reasonable cost incurred by respondent in modifying its brief. 
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